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Abstract— The wide adoption of gas fired units and power-
to-gas technology brings remarkable interdependency between
natural gas and electricity infrastructures. This paper studies the
equilibria of coupled gas and electricity energy markets driven by
the strategic bidding behavior: each producer endeavours to max-
imizes its own profit subjecting to the market clearing outcome.
The market equilibria is formulated as an equilibrium problem
with equilibrium constraints (EPEC). A special diagonalization
algorithm (DA) is devised, in which the unilateral equilibria of
the gas or electricity market is found in the inner loop given the
rival’s strategy; the interaction of the two markets are tackled
in the outer loop. Case studies on two test systems validates the
proposed methodology.
Index Terms—Bilevel optimization, electricity market, natural
gas market, interdependency, equilibrium problem with equilib-
rium constraints.
NOMENCLATURE
A. Sets and Indices
s ∈ S Strategic electricity producer (SEP)
o ∈ O Non-strategic electricity producer (Non-SEP)
i ∈ Is Units owned by SEP
j ∈ Jo Units owned by non-SEP
lp ∈ Lp Power grid lines
np ∈ N Power grid nodes
b ∈ B Energy block of each generator
v ∈ V Strategic gas producer (SGP)
w ∈W Non-strategic gas producer (Non-SGP)
m ∈Mv Gas wells owned by SGP
x ∈ Xw Gas wells owned by non-SGP
c ∈ C Active pipelines in gas network
lg ∈ Lg Passive pipelines in gas network
ng ∈ Ng Gas network nodes
z ∈ Z Power-to-Gas facilities
dp ∈ Dp Electricity loads
dg ∈ Dg Gas loads
ϕ¯sng Non-gas-fired units of SEP
ϕong Gas-fired units of non-SEP
ϕ¯ong Non-gas-fired units of non-SEP
ϕ{·}(ng) Components connected to node ng
This work is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of
China (51321005). The work of J. Wang is sponsored by the U. S. Department
of Energy.(Correspond to: Feng Liu)
C. Wang, W. Wei, F. Liu, and S. Mei are with the State Key
Laboratory of Power Systems, Department of Electrical Engineering
and Applied Electronic Technology, Tsinghua University, 100084 Beijing,
China. (c-w12@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn, wei-wei04@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn,
lfeng@mail.tsinghua.edu.cn, meishengwei@mail.tsinghua.edu.cn).
J. Wang is with Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, IL 60439, USA
(jianhui.wang@anl.gov).
ϕ{·}1(ng) Components whose head node is ng
ϕ{·}2(ng) Components whose tail node is ng
Llp(1, np) Power transmission lines whose head node is np
Llp(2, np) Power transmission lines whose tail node is np
φ{·}(np) Components connected to node np
Θ(np) Neighbouring nodes of node np
Linelp Head and tail node set of line lp
φ−1(·) Connection node of components in power system
ϕ−1(·) Connection node of components in gas system
ϕ−11 (·) Head node of components in gas system
ϕ−12 (·) Tail node of components in gas system
B. Parameters
λsib Marginal cost of non-gas-fired unit of SEP
λojb Marginal cost of non-gas-fired unit of non-SEP
Pdp Electricity load demand
P s,maxib Upper limit of block b of unit of SEP
P o,maxjb Upper limit of block b of unit of non-SEP
Flp Electricity transmission line capacity
Bnp1np2 Admittance of transmission line
qux Upper limit of gas well of non-SGP
qum Upper limit of gas well of SGP
qmaxc Capacity of active gas pipeline
qmaxlg Capacity of passive gas pipeline
qdg Gas load demand
ζvm Marginal cost of gas well of SGP
ζwx Marginal cost of gas well of non-SGP
τ Energy conversion constant
ηib, ηjb Efficiency of units
ηz Efficiency of power-to-gas facilities
αmax Maximal bidding price of SEP
δmax maximal bidding price of SGP
C. Variables
βnp Local marginal electricity price
αsib Bidding price of SEP
P sib Cleared output of unit of SEP
P ojb Cleared output of unit of non-SEP
θnp Phase angle of power nodes
%ng Local marginal gas price
δvm Bidding price of SGP
qvm Cleared output of gas well of SGP
qwx Cleared output of gas well of non-SGP
qc Gas flow in active pipeline
qlg Gas flow in passive pipeline
Pz Demand of P2G facilities
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2I. INTRODUCTION
OVER the past decade, there has been remarkable interestin the utilization of gas fired units due to its high
efficiency and low carbon emission, thanks to the break-
throughs in turbine technologies, say, the open-cycle gas
turbine (OCGT) and the combined-cycle gas turbine (CCGT),
as well as the dramatic decline in natural gas price, owing
to the shale rock revolution [1]. Meanwhile, emerging P2G
technology allows using excessive electricity produce gases
in a vast form, such as hydrogen and natural gas [2], which
can be stored in existing tanks in liquid or compressed format
without intensive investments on upgrading the energy storage
equipment. Such technologies greatly enhances the operating
flexibility of power systems with volatile renewable energy
integration. The potential bi-directional energy flows imposes
stronger interdependency between gas and electricity systems,
which calls for interdisciplinary research on the system oper-
ation and design.
Along this line, extensive researches can be found on the
topic of coordinated operation of power and gas systems. For
example, the optimal power and gas flow is analyzed in [3]; a
stochastic unit commitment is proposed in [4], which aims to
mitigate the variability of wind generation; a robust scheduling
model considering uncertain wind power and demand response
is investigated in [5]. To absorb excessive wind power, P2G
technology is comprehensively discussed in [6], which allows
a bi-directional interchange of energy. From the marketing per-
spective, the interdependency mentioned above impacts both
gas and electricity markets: on one hand, the price of natural
gas will influence the cost of gas-fired units as well as gas
demand in the electricity market; on the other hand, the price
of electricity will influence the cost of P2G facilities as well
as electricity demand in the gas market. Some inspiring work
have been done to address the correlation between electricity
and gas markets. The day-ahead strategic bidding behavior
of one CCGT owner is discussed in [7], taking operation
constraints from both power and gas system into consideration,
giving rise to a mathematical program with complementarity
constraints (MPCC) formulation. The interaction of power and
gas system models under a market environment in a medium-
long scope is analyzed in [8], in which the single-level model
includes power and gas operation constraints as well as the
operational cost of either of the systems as its objective.
In the pool-based setting, the pool is cleared by a market
operator (MO), an independent agency, given the bidding
strategies of all participants and necessary data. The market
power of strategic electricity producers has been well ex-
plored in existing studies since the pioneer work [9]. The
optimal bidding strategy of a single producer is analyzed in
[10], resulting in a MPCC formulation. The optimal bidding
strategies of multiple strategic producers are discussed in
[11], leading to an EPEC formulation, and is solved by a
stationary point method. The strategic behavior of wind power
producers are studied in [12], the resulting EPEC is solved
by diagonalization method. Similar to the pool-based power
market, the gas pool can be cleared by a gas market operator as
well. In this paper, we consider several energy producers who
trade their resources strategically, in coupled electricity and
gas markets. The strategic producers seek to maximize their
own profits by bidding their offering prices, and the market
will reach an equilibrium.
As one of the first few attempt, this paper proposes a
market mechanism that allows di-directional energy trading
between independently cleared power and natural gas markets.
An EPEC model is established to study the optimal bidding
strategies and market powers of energy producers. Moreover,
a dedicated diagonalization algorithm is designed to compute
the market equilibrium, in which the inner level provides the
equilibria associating with either the gas or electricity market
while fixing the exogenous variable from the other market; the
outer level coordinate the bidding strategies of both markets.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The basic set-
tings and market mechanism are elaborated in Section II. The
EPEC formulation of the optimal bidding problem in coupled
energy markets is presented in Section III. The diagonalization
algorithm is introduced in Section IV. To validate the proposed
model and algorithm, several numerical results on two testing
systems are shown in Section V. Finally, Section VI draws the
conclusion.
II. MARKET SETTINGS
A. Pool-based Market Mechanism
At the electricity side, SEPs such as generation compa-
nies receive local marginal gas price (LMGP) from the gas
market operator (GMO), and then bid their offering price to
the electricity market operator (EMO). The EMO clears the
electricity market in terms of social welfare maximization,
and the local marginal electricity price (LMEP) as well as
the gas demand of each SEP become clear. At the gas side,
strategic gas producers (SGPs) receive LMEP from the EMO,
and then bid their offering price to the GMO. The GMO clears
the gas market in terms of social welfare maximization, and
the LMGP as well as electricity demand of each P2G facility
become clear. It is apparent that the electricity market and
the gas market impacts each other through bi-directional gas-
electricity transitions. The schematic diagram of the coupled
energy markets are shown in Fig. 1.
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Fig. 1. Electricity and natural gas market framework.
B. Assumptions and Simplifications
The main assumptions made in the proposed model are
summarized as follows.
31) General settings: i. the SEPs and SGPs are paid at
LMEP and LMGP, respectively. Meanwhile, upper bounds
are imposed on the bidding prices. ii. The demands in both
markets are non-elastic. For detailed price-responsive load
model, one can refer to [11]. iii. in the current formulation,
we have adopted a static setting with a single period. The
multi-period case incorporating inter-temporal constraints can
be model in a similar way to that of [13].
2) For the power network: i. lossless DC power flow model
is adopted. ii. Voltage magnitude at each bus is assumed to be
close to 1.
3) For the gas network: i. we use a simplified steady-
state model, in which the linepack is neglected. Moreover,
we assume the gas flow in pipelines are directly controllable
and omit the gas nodal pressure variable, leading to a linear
approximation which is also used in [8], [14], [15]. This
simplification is reasonable when there are enough regulating
devices. ii. We adopt the simplified compressor model in
[16], for detailed modeling of the compressor, please refer
to [7]. iii. We don’t incorporate gas storage devices in current
formulation due to the static setting. For gas storage in a multi-
period model, one can refer to [8]. iv. We assume the P2G
facilities to be non-strategic.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. EPEC model for electricity market
In the electricity market, all SEPs aim to maximize their
individual profit, leading to the following formulation
∀s ∈ S, min
αsib
(
∑
(i∈ϕ¯su))b
λsibP
s
ib +
∑
(i∈ϕi(ng))b
τ%ngP
s
ib/ηib
−
∑
(i∈φi(np))b
βnpP
s
ib)
(1)
s.t. 0 ≤ αsib ≤ αsi(b+1) ≤ αmax, ∀i, ∀b < B (2)
P sib, βng ∈ arg{ min
P sib,P
o
jb,θ
(
∑
sib
αsibP
s
ib +
∑
o(j∈ϕ¯ong )b
λojbP
o
jb
+
∑
o(j∈ϕong )b
τ%ngP
o
jb/ηjb)
(3)
s.t. 0 ≤ P sib ≤ P s,maxib : βs,minib , βs,maxib ,∀s,∀i,∀b (4)
0 ≤ P ojb ≤ P o,maxjb : βo,minjb , βo,maxjb ,∀o,∀j,∀b (5)
∑
s(i∈φi(np))b
P sib +
∑
o(j∈φj(np))b
P ojb −
∑
z∈φz(np)
Pz−∑
d∈φd(np)
Pdp =
∑
k∈Θ(np)
Bnpkp(θnp − θkp) : βnp , ∀np
(6)
−Flp ≤Bnp1np2(θnp1 − θnp2) ≤ Flp : βminlp , βmaxlp
np1, np2 ∈ Linelp ,∀lp
(7)
− pi ≤ θnp ≤ pi : εminnp , εmaxnp ,∀np (8)
θnp = 0 : ε1, np = 1 } (9)
In this formulation, the upper level bidding problem consists
of (1)-(2) as well as the lower level electricity market clearing
problem (3)-(9). Objective function (1) represents the opposite
profit of strategic producer s, where the first two components
are the generation cost of non-gas-fired units and gas-fired
units, respectively, and the last component is the utility of all
generating units. (2) imposes upper and lower bounds on the
offering price, as well as the monotonicity with respect to the
energy block. The LMEP βnp and the energy contract P
s
ib are
determined by (3)-(9), which represents the electricity market
clearing process. Objective (3) represents the opposite social
welfare, where the first component is the generation expense
of strategic producers and the last two component are the
generation cost of non-gas-fired and gas-fired units owned by
non-strategic producers, respectively. Constraints (4) and (5)
are the energy block capacity of all type of units. Equality (6)
depicts the nodal power balancing condition. Inequality (7) is
the flow limit of transmission lines. Inequality (8) describes the
upper and lower phase angle limits of the complex bus voltage.
(9) sets the phase angle for the reference node. Dual variables
are indicated at the corresponding equations following a colon.
B. EPEC model for gas market
In the gas market, all SGPs aim to maximize their individual
profit, leading to the following formulation
∀v ∈ V, min
δvm
(
∑
m
ζvmq
v
m −
∑
(m∈ϕm(ng))
%ngq
v
m) (10)
s.t. 0 ≤ δvm ≤ δmax,∀m (11)
qvm, %ng ∈ arg{ min
qvm,q
w
x ,qc,qlg ,Pz
(
∑
vm
δvmq
v
m +
∑
wx
ζwx q
w
x +∑
(z∈φz(np))
βnpPz)
(12)
s.t. 0 ≤ qvm ≤ qum : ρminm , ρmaxm ∀m, ∀v (13)
0 ≤ qwx ≤ qux : ρminx , ρmaxx ∀x, ∀w (14)
− qmaxlg ≤ qlg ≤ qmaxlg : ρminlg , ρmaxlg ∀lg (15)
0 ≤ qc ≤ qmaxc : ρminc , ρmaxc ∀c (16)
0 ≤ Pz : ρz ∀z (17)
∑
v(m∈ϕm(ng))
qvm +
∑
w(x∈ϕx(ng))
qwx +
∑
z∈ϕz(ng)
τηzPz =∑
{·}∈ϕ{·}1 (ng)
q{·} −
∑
{·}∈ϕ{·}2 (ng)
q{·} +
∑
dg∈ϕdg (ng)
qdg
+
∑
s(i∈ϕi(ng))b
τP sib/ηib +
∑
o(j∈ϕj(ng))b
τP ojb/ηjb : %ng
{·} = {c, lg}, ∀ng }
(18)
4In this formulation, the upper level bidding problem consists
of (10)-(11) as well as the lower level gas market clearing
problem (12)-(18). The objective function (10) represents the
opposite profit of strategic gas producer v, where the first
component is the production cost and the second component
is the utility of all the gas production. (11) restricts the
upper and lower bound of gas offering price. The LMGP
%ng and the gas contract q
v
m are determined by (12)-(18),
which represents the gas market clearing process. Objective
function (12) defines the opposite social welfare, where the
first two components are the generation expenses of strategic
and non-strategic gas producers, respectively, and the last
component is the electricity purchase cost of P2G facilities.
Constraints (13) and (14) give the production limits of gas
wells of strategic and non-strategic producers, respectively. In
the natural gas network, pipelines without/with compressors
are called passive/active. Gas flow capacities of passive and
active pipelines are represented by (15) and (16), respectively.
(17) indicates a non-negative constraint on the electricity
demand of P2G facilities. (18) is the nodal gas balancing
condition. Dual variables are indicated at the corresponding
equations following a colon.
IV. SOLUTION METHODOLOGY
In this section, we first present equivalent MPCC formula-
tions for the bilevel bidding problems associated with each
player in the upper level. Then a special diagonalization
algorithm (DA) is introduced to solve the proposed EPEC
models by iteratively solving a sequence of MPCCs, until a
certain convergence criteria is met.
A. Solution Methodology for MPCCs
Take the electricity market as an example. For SEP s∗, if the
LMGPs, the electricity demand from P2G facilities as well as
the bidding strategies from other SEPs are fixed, the unilateral
optimal bidding problem of SEP s∗ presented in (1)-(9) can
be cast as the following MPCC
min
αs
∗
ib
(
∑
(i∈ϕ¯s∗ng ))b
λs
∗
ib P
s∗
ib +
∑
(i∈ϕi(ng))b
τ%ngP
s∗
ib /ηib−
∑
(i∈φi(np))b
βnpP
s∗
ib )
(19)
s.t. (2), (4)− (9)
αsib−βnp +βs,maxib −βs,minib = 0, ∀i,∀b,∀s, np = φ−1i (20)
λojb − βnp + βo,maxjb − βo,minjb = 0,
j ∈ ϕong ,∀b,∀s, np = φ−1j
(21)
τ%ng/ηjb − βnp + βo,maxjb − βo,minjb = 0,
j ∈ ϕ¯ong ,∀b,∀s, np = φ−1j
(22)
∑
kp∈Θ(np)
Bnk(βnp − βkp) + εmaxnp − εminnp − (ε1)np=1
+
∑
np∈Llp (1,np)
Bnpkp(β
max
lp − βminlp )−∑
np∈Llp (1,np)
Bnpkp(β
max
lp − βminlp ) = 0, ∀np
(23)
0 ≤ P sib ⊥ βs,minib ≥ 0, ∀s,∀i,∀b (24)
0 ≤ P s,maxib − P sib ⊥ βs,maxib ≥ 0, ∀s,∀i,∀b (25)
0 ≤ P ojb ⊥ βo,minjb ≥ 0, ∀o,∀j,∀b (26)
0 ≤ P o,maxjb − P ojb ⊥ βo,maxjb ≥ 0, ∀o,∀j,∀b (27)
0 ≤ Flp −Bnp1np2(θnp1 − θnp2) ⊥ βmaxlp ≥ 0,
np1, np2 ∈ Linelp ,∀lp
(28)
0 ≤ Bnp1np2(θnp1 − θnp2) + Flp ⊥ βminlp ≥ 0,
np1, np2 ∈ Linelp ,∀lp
(29)
0 ≤ pi − θnp ⊥ εmaxnp ≥ 0, ∀np (30)
0 ≤ θnp + pi ⊥ εminnp ≥ 0, ∀np (31)
where, (20)-(31) are the KKT optimality conditions of the
lower level electricity market clearing problem, the notation
0 ≤ a ⊥ b ≥ 0 represents the complementarity and slackness
conditions a ≥ 0, b ≥ 0, and ab = 0.
Similarly, for SGP v∗ in the gas market, if the LMEPs,
the gas demand from gas-fired units as well as the bidding
strategies from other SGPs are fixed, the unilateral optimal
bidding problem of SGP v∗ presented in (10)-(18) can be cast
as the following MPCC
min
δv∗m
(
∑
m
ζv
∗
m q
v∗
m −
∑
(m∈ϕm(ng))
%ngq
v∗
m ) (32)
s.t. (11), (13)− (18)
δvm + ρ
max
m − ρminm − %ng = 0, ∀m,∀v, ng = ϕ−1(m) (33)
ζwx + ρ
max
x − ρminx − %ng = 0, ∀x, ∀w, ng = ϕ−1(x) (34)
ρmaxc − ρminc + %ng1 − %ng2 = 0,
∀c, ng1 = ϕ−11 (c), ng2 = ϕ−12 (c)
(35)
ρmaxlg − ρminlg + %ng1 − %ng2 = 0,
∀lg, ng1 = ϕ−11 (lg), ng2 = ϕ−12 (lg)
(36)
βnp−ρz−τηz%ng = 0,∀z, np = φ−1(z), ng = ϕ−1(z) (37)
0 ≤ qvm ⊥ ρminm ≥ 0, ∀m, ∀v (38)
0 ≤ qum − qvm ⊥ ρmaxm ≥ 0, ∀m,∀v (39)
0 ≤ qwx ⊥ ρminx ≥ 0, ∀x,∀w (40)
0 ≤ qux − qwx ⊥ ρmaxx ≥ 0, ∀x, ∀w (41)
0 ≤ qlg + qmaxlg ⊥ ρminlg ≥ 0,∀lg (42)
0 ≤ qmaxlg − qlg ⊥ ρmaxlg ≥ 0,∀lg (43)
0 ≤ qc ⊥ ρminc ≥ 0,∀c (44)
0 ≤ qmaxc − qc ⊥ ρmaxc ≥ 0,∀c (45)
50 ≤ Pz ⊥ ρz ≥ 0,∀z (46)
where, (33)-(46) are the KKT optimality conditions of the
lower level gas market clearing problem.
There are two sorts of nonlinearities in the proposed MPCC:
one is the summation of bilinear terms
∑
(i∈φi(np))b βnpP
s∗
ib in
(19) and
∑
(m∈ϕm(ng)) γngq
v∗
m in (32), consisting of products
of primal variable and dual variable; the other is the comple-
mentarity constraints, including (24)-(31) and (38)-(46). The
linearization methods are introduced below.
1) Linearizing the primal-dual product: linear expressions
can be obtained to replace the bilinear terms in the original
objective function by strong duality theorem and KKT com-
plementarity constraints. The linearized objective functions are
given below. Details can be found in the Appendix.
min
αs
∗
ib ,P
s∗
ib
(
∑
(i∈ϕi(ng))b
τ%ngP
s∗
ib /ηib +
∑
(i∈ϕ¯s∗ng ))b
λs
∗
ib P
s∗
ib +
∑
np
pi(εmaxnp + ε
min
np ) +
∑
lp
Flp(β
max
lp + β
min
lp )
+
∑
ib
(
∑
s
P s,maxib β
s,max
ib +
∑
o
P o,maxib β
o,max
ib )
+
∑
(s 6=s∗)ib
αsibP
s
ib +
∑
o(j∈ϕ¯ong )b
λojbP
o
jb + βnp
∑
dp∈φdp (np)
Pdp+
∑
o(j∈ϕong )b
τ%ngP
o
jb/ηjb − βs
∗,max
ib P
s∗,max
ib +
∑
z∈φz(np)
βnpPz)
(47)
min
δv∗m ,qv
∗
m
(
∑
m
ζv
∗
m q
v∗
m −
∑
m
ρmaxm q
max
m −
∑
m
δv
∗
m q
v∗
m−∑
(v 6=v∗)m
δvmq
v
m −
∑
(z∈φz(np))
βnpPz −
∑
wx
ζwx q
w
x )−
−
∑
c
qmaxc ρ
max
c −
∑
vm
ρmaxm q
u
m −
∑
wx
ρmaxx q
u
x−∑
lg
(ρminlg + ρ
max
lg )q
max
y + (
∑
e∈ϕe(ng)
qe+∑
s(i∈ϕi(ng))b
τP sib/ηib +
∑
o(j∈ϕj(ng))b
τP ojb/ηjb)%ng
(48)
2) Complementarity Constraint: All complementarity con-
straints in KKT condition share the similar form of
0 ≤ a− f ⊥ g ≥ 0 (49)
Where a, f, g represent the primal variable, constant and dual
variable, respectively. By introducing a binary variable h and
the following constraints, (49) can be fully linearized.
a− f ≤ BigM · h
g ≤ BigM(1− h) (50)
Where BigM is a sufficient large positive number.
In view of the linearized objective functions and constraints,
the MPCCs of SEP and SGP have been converted into mixed
integer linear problems (MILPs), and are readily solvable by
using commercial solvers, such as Cplex and Gurobi.
B. The Nested Diagonalization Algorithm
In this subsection, a nested diagonalization algorithm is
proposed to find the equilibria in the coupled electricity-
gas market. For notation brevity, we use Ps(s ∈ S) and
Gv(v ∈ V ) to represent the strategic bidding problem for
SEPs and SGPs in MILP form, respectively. The aggregated
problems {Ps},∀s and {Gv},∀v represent denote the EPECs
of the electricity market and gas market, respectively.
1) Inner Diagonalization Algorithms: Two inner DAs are
introduced to solve the EPEC models for electricity and gas
market, respectively, the flow charts are given below.
Algorithm 1 DA for EPEC of electricity market
1: Get current Pz, %ng as input. Set α
s,0
ib = α
max for
all s, i, b. Set the maximum iteration number rmax and
convergence criterion . r = 1, F lagp = 0.
2: Do for s∗ = 1, . . . , S, regard αs,0ib (s 6= s∗) as the bidding
price from others. Solve Ps∗ and obtain α
s∗,r
ib . Let α
s∗,0
ib =
αs
∗,r
ib .
3: If |αs,rib − αs,r−1ib |≤ · max{αs,rib , αs,r−1ib } for all s, then
terminate, and report αs,rib . Else,
4: if r = rmax, set Flagp = 1, then quit and report the inner
DA for electricity market fails to converge. Else, r = r+1
and return to Step 2.
Algorithm 2 DA for EPEC of gas market
1: Get current P sib, P
o
jb, βnp as input. Set δ
v,0
m = δ
max for
all v,m. Set the maximum iteration number rmax and
convergence criterion . r = 1, F lagg = 0.
2: Do for v∗ = 1, . . . , V , regard δv,0m (v 6= v∗) as the bidding
price from others. Solve Gv∗ and obtain δv
∗,r
m . Let δ
v∗,0
m =
δv
∗,r
m .
3: If |δv,rm − δv,r−1m |≤ · max{δv,rm , δv,r−1m } for all v, then
terminate, and report δv,rm . Else,
4: if r = rmax, set Flagg = 1, then quit and report the inner
DA for gas market fails to converge. Else, r = r + 1 and
return to Step 2.
2) Outer Diagonalization Algorithm: Similar to [17], we
adopt an iterative-based algorithm to find the equilibria of the
coupled energy markets, which is referred to as outer DA. The
flow chart is given below.
Other than the proposed nested DA, traditional DA is also a
straightforward method to find the equilibria in the gas-electric
market. However, the computational cost of traditional DA is
much higher than the nested DA, sometimes even fails to solve
the EPEC model. The reason is that the updating variables
in the outer DA are already equilibriums, say equilibriums
in electricity market and gas market, respectively, while the
updating variables in traditional DA are not.
V. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
In this section, we present numerical experiments on two
testing systems to show the effectiveness of the proposed
model and algorithm. The experiments are performed on a
6Algorithm 3 DA fot equilibria of the coupled markets
1: Set %0ng = δ
max, P 0z = 0, P
s,0
ib = 0,P
o,0
jb = 0,β
0
np =
αmax. Set the maximum iteration number rmax and
convergence criterion . r = 1.
2: Call Algorithm 1 and obtain αsib. Solve problem (3)-(9),
and obtain P s,rib , P
o,r
jb , β
r
np .
3: Call Algorithm 2 and obtain δvm. Solve problem (12)-(18),
and obtain P rz , %
r
ng .
4: If |P rz − P r−1z |≤ · max{P rz , P r−1z } for all z, |P s,rib −
P s,r−1ib |≤ · max{P s,rib , P s,r−1ib } for all s, |P o,rjb −
P o,r−1jb |≤ ·max{P o,rjb , P o,r−1jb } for all o, all holds, then
quit, and report αsib, δ
v
m, Pz, P
s
ib, P
o
jb. Else,
5: If r = rmax, or Flagp = 1, or Flagg = 1, then quit and
report the algorithm fails to converge. Else, r = r+1 and
return to Step 2.
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Fig. 2. Topology of the hybrid test system.
laptop with Intel(R) Core(TM) 2 Duo 2.2 GHz CPU and 4
GB memory. The proposed algorithms are implemented on
MATLAB with YALMIP toolbox. MILP is solved by Gurobi
6.5, the optimality gap is set as 0.1% without particular
mention.
A. 6-Bus Power System with 7-Node Gas System
Fig. 2 depicts the topology of the interconnected infras-
tructure. It has 4 gas-fired units (P2, P4, P6, P7), 4 traditional
coal-fired units (P1, P3, P5, P8), 6 gas wells (G1 − G6), 1
compressor, 2 P2G facilities (P2G1, P2G2), 4 power loads
and 3 gas loads. Specifically, the head and tail node of
the compressor is 4 and 2, respectively. The parameters of
the system can be found in [18]. The total electricity and
gas demand are 525MW and 5520Sm3, respectively. In the
following cases, we have 4 strategic producers in the electricity
market, who own generator P1 to P4, respectively, and the rest
units are owned by a non-strategic producer. Also, we have 3
strategic producers in the gas market, who own gas well G1 to
G3, respectively, and the rest gas wells are owned by a non-
strategic producer.  in the proposed diagonalization algorithm
is 1% and the maximum iteration number is 20.
TABLE I
RESULTS OF UNCONGESTED NETWORK
Power Gas Exchange
α
($/MWh) 16.67
δ
($/Sm3) 0.9
Gas
(Sm3/h)
P2 0
β
($/MWh) 16.67
%
($/Sm3) 0.9 P4 2486
P4
(MW) 143.5
G1
(Sm3/h) 3300 P6 2694
P6
(MW) 157.6
G2
(Sm3/h) 3000 P7 1230
P7
(MW) 68.95
G3
(Sm3/h) 2630 Power
(MW)
P2G1 0
P8
(MW) 155
G4
(Sm3/h) 3000 P2G2 0
B. Uncongested Network
The coupled energy market and its equilibria is firstly
studied without considering congestions by neglecting capacity
constraints, including those of power transmission lines and
gas pipelines. The optimal bidding strategies and energy
contracts are listed in Table I, where both the superscript and
the subscript are omitted for the price variables. The output of
generators and gas wells which do not appear in Table I are 0.
In the power network, all buses share the same LMEP, because
the network is uncongested. The bidding price are equal to
the corresponding LMEPs. The committed power from each
block of generator can be obtained according to their capacity
parameters. In the gas market, due to the existence of active
pipeline as well as its radial topology, the LMGPs could be
different at the head node and the tail nodes of an active
pipeline. In this particular case, all the LMGPs are the same,
and the strategic gas producers bid the same price equal to
the LMGP. The energy exchange between electricity market
and gas market are also listed in Table I. Intuitively, the
power consumption of P2G facilities should be zero in an
uncongested network as the equivalent gas price should be
higher than the LMGPs in general, due to the dissipativity of
energy conversion.
Then we change the electricity and gas load by their load
ratios, respectively. The corresponding nodal prices are shown
in Fig. 3-Fig. 5. From Fig. 3, it can be observed that the
LMEP is always nondecreasing with the gas load ratio (GLR)
when electricity load ratio is fixed. However, the relationship
between LMEP and electricity load ratio (ELR) is quite
complicated, whose general trend is increasing yet sometimes
decreases, say there is a drop when ELR is 0.8, which is
mainly caused by competition in the electricity pool as the
LMGPs remain the same when ELR varies from 0.75 to 0.9.
Further, from Fig. 4 and Fig. 5, the LMGPs of two sides of
active pipeline are different in most cases. Also, the general
variation trend of Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 are the same.
C. Congested Network
The analysis in the previous subsection is performed again
with transmission capacity limits becoming mandatory, includ-
ing those of power transmission lines and gas pipelines. The
transmission capacity parameter can be found in [18]. The
results are listed in Table II. In the gas market, SGPs seek to
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bid higher prices due to congestion, which would give rise to
the marginal cost increment of gas-fired units. In the electricity
market, SEPs also seek to bid higher prices due to congestion,
moreover, some of them are suffering from a higher marginal
cost. Therefore, the bidding prices of SEP 4 as well as SGP
1,3 reach their maximum value, respectively, in the equilibria.
In this regard, the MO of electricity market may try to dispatch
more traditional generation assets to maximize social welfare.
Thus, the total gas consumption from gas-fired units has a
2385 Sm3/h reduction compared with the uncongested case.
Meanwhile, traditional units, say P1 and P2, are put into
operation in this case while they are out of service in the
TABLE II
RESULTS OF CONGESTED NETWORK
Power Gas
β ($/MWh) Output (MW) % ($/Sm3) Output (Sm3/h)
1 15.42 P1 54.25 1 0.6 1 0
2 17.33 P2 55.15 2 0.9 2 534.4
3 13.51 P3 82.75 3 0.8 3 2251
4 36.18 P4 20.25 4 2 4 3000
5 38.09 P5 0 5 0.9 5 2000
6 40 P6 157.6 6 0.9 6 1760
α ($/MWh) P7 0 7 2 G2P (Sm3/h)
1 15.42 P8 155 δ ($/Sm3) P2 989
2 17.33 P2G (MW) 1 2 P4 342
3 13.51 P2G1 0 2 0.9 P6 2694
4 40 P2G2 0 3 2 P7 0
TABLE III
COMPUTATIONAL TIME UNDER DIFFERENT CASE SETTINGS
Uncongested
NSP Time (s) NSP Time (s) NSP Time (s)
(3,3) 99 (4,3) 117 (5,3) 48
(3,4) 167 (4,4) 195 (5,4) 203
(3,5) 259 (4,5) 209 (5,5) 271
Congested
NSP Time (s) NSP Time (s) NSP Time (s)
(3,3) 40 (4,3) 296 (5,3) 327
(3,4) 39 (4,4) 313 (5,4) 324
(3,5) 47 (4,5) 247 (5,5) 335
uncongested case. It can be observed that the P2G facilities
are not working as they are still not cost-effective according
to the gas market clearing model.
From the maximum social welfare perspective, the pro-
duction cost of the power network in the congested case is
increased by $221 compared with the uncongested case, from
$7,539 to $7,760, and the production cost of the gas network
in the congested case is increased by $439 compared with the
uncongested case, from $9,537 to $9,976.
D. 118-Bus Power System with 20-Node Gas System
In this subsection, we apply the proposed model and al-
gorithm to a larger test system, which consists of a modified
IEEE 118-bus system and the Belgian high-calorific 20-node
gas network. It possesses 30 gas-fired units, 24 traditional
units, 10 gas wells, 3 compressors, 4 P2G facilities, 91 power
loads and 9 gas loads. Refer to [18] for the network topology
and system data set. Table III summarizes the computational
times with different numbers of strategic producers indicated
by a tuple (a, b), where a is the number of SGPs and b is
the number of SEPs. The details of ownership of units and
gas wells can be found in [18]. From Table III we see that
the computational time are always acceptable for the coupled
energy market in this moderately sized system.
VI. CONCLUSION
With the physical and economic interdependency between
the natural gas and electricity systems becoming stronger,
this paper propose an EPEC model that allows bi-directional
gas-power trading, and a nested diagnalization algorithm to
compute the market equilibria. Simulation results corrobo-
rate the effectiveness of the proposed method. The proposed
8methodology will be desired by policy makers and market
designers.
APPENDIX
For strategic producer s∗, multiplying both sides of (20) by
P s
∗
ib and adding them together, yields following equation:∑
ib
(αs
∗
ib + β
s∗,max
ib − βs
∗,min
ib )P
s∗
ib −
∑
(i∈φi(np))b
βnpP
s∗
ib = 0
(51)
From (24)-(25), we have
βs
∗,min
ib P
s∗
ib = 0⇒
∑
ib
βs
∗,min
ib P
s∗
ib = 0
βs
∗,max
ib P
s∗
ib = β
s∗,max
ib P
s∗,max
ib ⇒∑
ib
βs
∗,max
ib P
s∗
ib =
∑
ib
βs
∗,max
ib P
s∗,max
ib
(52)
Substitute some terms in (51) with (52), we have∑
(i∈φi(np))b
βnpP
s∗
ib =
∑
ib
(αs
∗
ib P
s∗
ib + β
s∗,max
ib P
s∗,max
ib ) (53)
From strong duality theorem, we have∑
ib
αs
∗
ib P
s∗
ib +
∑
(s6=s∗)ib
αsibP
s
ib +
∑
o(j∈ϕ¯ong )b
λojbP
o
jb+
∑
o(j∈ϕong )b
τ%ngP
o
jb/ηjb = −
∑
np
pi(εmaxnp + ε
min
np )
−
∑
ib
(
∑
s
P s,maxib β
s,max
ib +
∑
o
P o,maxib β
o,max
ib )−∑
lp
Flp(β
max
lp + β
min
lp ) +
∑
oj
P o,minj ν
o,min
j
− βnp(
∑
z∈φz(np)
Pz +
∑
dp∈φdp (np)
Pdp)
(54)
By Substituting (54) into (53), we arrive at the linear
expression of
∑
(i∈φi(np))b βnpP
s∗
ib as shown in (47).
For strategic producer v∗, multiplying both sides of (33) by
qv
∗
m and adding them together with respect to m, yielding the
following equation:∑
m
(δv
∗
m + ρ
max
m − ρminm )qv
∗
m −
∑
(ng=ϕ−1(m))
%ngq
v∗
m = 0 (55)
From (38)-(39), we have (56). Substitute some terms in (55)
with (56), we have (57). From strong duality theorem, we have
(58). By substituting (58) into (57), we arrive at the linear
expression of
∑
(m∈ϕm(ng)) γngq
v∗
m as shown in (48).
qv
∗
m ρ
min
m = 0⇒
∑
m
qv
∗
m ρ
min
m = 0
qv
∗
m ρ
max
m = q
max
m ρ
max
m ⇒
∑
m
qv
∗
m ρ
max
m =
∑
m
qmaxm ρ
max
m
(56)∑
(ng=ϕ−1(m))
%ngq
v∗
m =
∑
m
δv
∗
m q
v∗
m +
∑
m
ρmaxm q
max
m (57)
∑
m
δv
∗
m q
v∗
m +
∑
(v 6=v∗)m
δvmq
v
m +
∑
(z∈φz(np))
βnpPz+∑
wx
ζwx q
w
x = −
∑
c
qmaxc ρ
max
c −
∑
vm
ρmaxm q
u
m−∑
lg
(ρminlg + ρ
max
lg )q
max
lg −
∑
wx
ρmaxx q
u
x + (
∑
dg∈ϕdg (ng)
qdg
+
∑
s(i∈ϕi(ng))b
τP sib/ηib +
∑
o(j∈ϕj(ng))b
τP ojb/ηjb)%ng
(58)
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